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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
attitude, the visiting professor gladly assumes responsibility. The
application of the method to specific problems has been the stu-
dents' task and responsibility. I have, of course, attempted to do
my best in being available with advice and suggestions, and I
have to confess that in quite a few places I have attempted to
help student writers in their mode of arrangement or presenta-
tion. But, senior students of the Louisiana State University Law
School all seem to possess one of the lawyer's most precious
qualities, namely, independence of mind. They can be convinced,
at least most of the time, but they cannot be persuaded. Thus,
for his final product each of the student authors has to assume
individual responsibility as he is entitled to individual credit. But
it was the visiting professor's privilege to work with the law re-
view students and to profit from their research and their ideas.
He believes that similar profits can be obtained from the stu-
dents' endeavors by the readers of the Louisiana Law Review.
Baton Rouge, La.
December, 1949.
MAX RHEINSTEIN*
CHOICE OF LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
The American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently pub-
lished a proposed draft of a Uniform Commercial Code.' If the
expectations of the draftsmen are realized, this code will answer
the great demand of modern business for uniformity and cer-
tainty in commercial law. But, however meritorious the code
may be as substantive law, maximum national uniformity can
only be achieved by the adoption of the code in the forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia. The possibility that such
unanimous reception will not take place has been anticipated
by the drafters. For the first time in the history of the Uniform
Laws, provision has been made for that perennial problem, the
conflict of laws. Section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides: 2
* Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago.
1. May 1949 draft.
2. The following is a copy of the October 1949 revision of this section.
Substantial changes were made between this and the proposal embodied in
the May 1949 draft.
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"(1) In any suit brought in this state this Act shall apply
to any contract or transaction within its terms if the contract
is made or the transaction occurs after the effective date of
this Act, and
"(a) the contract is completed, or the offer made
or accepted, or the transaction occurs within
this state; or
"(b) the contract is to be performed or the trans-
action is to be completed within this .state; or
"(c) the contract or transaction relates to or in-
volves goods which are to be or are in fact
located, delivered, shipped or received within
this state; or
"(d) the contract or transaction involves a bill of
lading, warehouse receipt or other document
of title which is to be or is in fact issued, de-
livered, sent or received within this state; or
"(e) the contract or transaction involves commer-
cial paper which is made, drawn, transferred
or payable within this state; or
"(f) the contract or transaction involves a commer-
cial credit made, sent or received within this
state; or involves a commercial credit issued in
this state or confirmation or advice of which
is sent or received within this state, or involves
any negotiation within this state of a draft
drawn under a credit; or I
"(g) the contract or transaction involves a foreign
remittance drawn, transferred or payable
within this state; or
"(h) the contract or transaction involves an invest-
ment security issued or transferred within
this state; or
"(i) the contract or transaction involves a security
interest created within this state or relating
to tangible personal property which is or is to
be actually within this state or to intangible
personal property which has or is to have its
situs within this state; or involves a bulk trans-
fer of property to the extent that such prop-
erty is within this state; or if the borrower's
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principal place of business is within this state;
or
"(j) whenever the contract, instrument or docu-
ment states in terms or in substance that it is
subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing
subsection, the parties to a contract or transaction involving
foreign trade may agree in writing that the law of a specified
jurisdiction shall apply.
"COMMENT.
"Prior Uniform. Statutory Provision: None.
"Purposes:
"1. This Section gives direction to the court of a state
which has enacted the Code when to apply its provisions
to a given transaction before it, the transaction having con-
tacts not only with that state but also with other states or
jurisdictions. When the transaction takes place in its entirety
in a state which has enacted the Code, no question of applica-
bility in the sense of this Section arises; the Code applies.
When suit is instituted in a state which has not enacted the
Code but the transaction has contacts with a state that has,
if the choice of law rule of the former points to the latter
state, this Section does not and is not intended to prevent
the application of any of the provisions of this Act.
"2. The provisions of the Section change pre-existing
rules of the common law with regard to the application of
the local or foreign rules of law to settle the rights of parties
in a particular case. The offer here is to make a provision
which will call for the application of the rules provided in
this Code whenever the transaction has a sufficient contact
with the state having the Code to make such an application
reasonable and not arbitrary. It is to be noted, also, that
parties may, if they wish, contract for the application of the
Code to their dealings regardless of whether part of the trans-
action occurs within the state or not.
"3. Parties may, in transactions involving foreign trade,
agree that the provisions of this Act shall not apply. It was
felt that it would be going too far to require the application
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of the Code to the American acceptance of a foreign offer
which might come from one living under a system of law
quite different from our own and means for making it in-
applicable are therefore provided."
In order to provide coverage for commercial contracts and
transactions falling within the federal sphere of regulation and
control, an alternative Section 1-1053 is provided for use when
the Uniform Commercial Code is introduced in the Congress of
the United States. For purposes of clarity and simplicity of
exposition, the whole of this alternative section, with the Com-
ment of the draftsmen, is here reproduced.
"Section 1-105. Applicability of the Act.
"(1) This Act shall apply whenever any contract or
transaction within its terms is made or occurs after the
effective date of this Act; and
"(a) is in interstate or foreign commerce or affects
interstate commerce; or
"(b) is completed, or the offer is made or accepted
within federal territory which for the purpose
of this Act includes any territory outside of
the states and not having its own legislature;
or
"(c) is to be performed or completed within federal
territory; or
"(d) relates to or involves goods which are to be or
are in fact located, delivered, shipped or re-
ceived within federal territory; or
"(e) involves a bill of lading, warehouse receipt or
other document of title which is to be or is in
fact issued, delivered, sent or received within
federal territory; or
"(f) involves commercial paper which is made,
drawn, transferred or payable within federal
territory; or
"(g) is an application or agreement for a commer-
cial credit made, sent or received within fed-
eral territory; or involves a commercial credit
issued in federal territory or under which
drafts are to be presented in federal territory
3. Ibid.
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or confirmation or advice of which is sent or
received within federal territory of a draft
drawn under a credit; or
"(h) involves a foreign remittance drawn, trans-
ferred or payable within federal territory; or
"(i) involves an investment security issued or
transferred within federal territory; or
"(j) whenever the contract, instrument or docu-
ment states in terms or in substance that it is
subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing
subsection, the parties to a contract or transaction involving
foreign trade may agree in writing that the law of a specified
jurisdiction shall apply.
"COMMENT.
"Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None.
"Purposes:
"1. Hitherto the field of law covered by this statute has
been almost entirely state law.
"Today the number of commercial transactions which
pass between the states or which directly or indirectly affect
interstate commerce has become so great as to warrant the
Congress of the United States in entering the field by enact-
ing this Code to apply wherever the contract or transaction
falls within the permissible jurisdiction of Congress under the
commerce clause as that jurisdiction has been defined in the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
construing the words 'affects interstate commerce.'
"2. In addition, the Act is intended to apply to all trans-
actions over which Congress, as the legislative authority for
federal territory, has jurisdiction, where the federal territory
is outside of the states and does not have its own legislature.
The offer here is to make a provision which will call for the
application of the rules provided in this Code whenever the
transaction has a sufficient contact with a federal territory
to make such an application reasonable and not arbitrary.
It is to be noted, also, that parties may, if they wish, con-
tract for the application of the Code to their dealings regard-
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less of whether part of the transaction occurs within a fed-
eral territory or not.
"3. Parties may, in transactions involving foreign trade,
agree that the provisions of this Act shall not apply. It was
felt that it would, be going too far to require the application
of the Code to the American acceptance of a foreign offer
which might come from one living under a system of law
quite different from our own and means for making it inap-
plicable are therefore provided."
The Comment of the draftsmen indicates that the federal
version is designed to cover commercial contracts and trans-
actions when any of the contacts enumerated in Section 1-105
occur within federal territory. This version would also extend
the application of the act to commercial contracts or transac-
tions in interstate or foreign commerce or affecting interstate
commerce.4  A comparison of these two sections discloses cer-
tain important differences in substance and style. The state
version declares that "this Act shall apply to any contract or
transaction within its terms," but the federal version states only
when the act applies, and gives no indication as to what the
act applies.
There is no parallelism of method of presentation in the
federal and the state versions. Subsections 1(a) through 1(i)
of the federal version are mere phrases commencing with verbs,
which find their subjects in the introductory clause. Sub-
section 1 (j) of the very same section is itself a complete ad-
verbial clause. This manner of presentation was followed by
both sections in an earlier draft, but the state version was
later modified to conform with better English usage.5 It is of.
course to be desired that both sections adhere to such standards.
It is difficult to understand why Subsection 1 (g) of the
federal version differs in phraseology from that of the corre-
sponding Subsection 1(f) of the state version. In the original
draft both of these subsections contained similar language, but
the state version was amended to give greater clarity and ex-
actness. 6  The improvement in the redraft of the state version
4. It is not within the province of this article to discuss the effect that
this section may have upon the law pertaining to foreign and interstate
commerce.
5. Compare federal and state versions of the May 1949 draft with those
of the October 1949 revisions of that section.
6. Ibid.
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subsection could well be extended to the corresponding sub-
section in the federal version.
The state version contains Subsection 1 (i) dealing with secu-
rity interests and similar transactions, but there is no counterpart
of this subsection in the federal version. An earlier draft of the
federal version provided for security transactions, yet no reason
for the deletion from the present draft is given in the Comment
of the drafters. The only apparent explanation for this omission
is inadvertence.
Another basic difference between the federal and state ver-
sions of Section 1-105 is the court or courts to which each is
directed. The state version directs the courts of the adopting state
to apply the Commercial Code in certain enumerated instances.
The subsections of the federal version creating choice of law rules
for the federal territories are much broader in operation. If any
one of the events enumerated in Subsections 1 (b) through 1 (j)
of the federal version occurs in a federal territory, the draft
would order every American forum to apply the Commercial
Code to issues arising between the parties to a commercial trans-
action. Thus, according to Subsection 1 (b), if an offer were sent
from the Virgin Islands to a party in Florida, all issues between
the parties to the transaction would have to be determined by the
Commercial Code, regardless of the forum state. It is at least
doubtful whether Congress has the constitutional power to thus
impose choice of law rules upon the states.
The most serious objections to Section 1-105 arise as to the
desirability and practicability of the criteria set forth to deter-
mine the applicability of the code. These possible difficulties
apply alike to both federal and state version, but in order to
facilitate simplicity of analysis, only the state version will be
specifically discussed herein.
In the Comment the drafters frankly admit that Section 1-105
is a departure from present choice of law rules. The stated inten-
tion was "to make a provision which will call for the application
of the rules provided in the Code whenever the transaction has
a sufficient contact with the state having the code to makesuch
an application reasonable and not arbitrary." This, discussion
will center around an analysis of the various provisions of Sec-
tion 1-105 in an attempt to ascertain whether or not it would be
"reasonable and not arbitrary" to apply the code to factual situa-
tions falling within the ambit of that section.
Section 1-105 is directed toward the achievement of the
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widest possible application of the new code. While the purpose
of wide application is clear, the means to this end are most
unusual. Emphasis is placed entirely on contacts with the state of
the forum. If all the elements of a transaction occur in states
other than the state which has adopted the code, Section 1-105
does not attempt to indicate the law applicable to issues between
the parties. But the broad, all inclusive language used in this
section will force the application of the code to contracts having
only a slight connection with the code state. The unreasonable-
ness of this approach may be best illustrated by the following
analysis of the individual subsections.
Subsections 1 (a) and 1 (b) represent a combination and ex-
tension of two of the traditional rules of conflict of laws, that is,
one pointing to the law of the place of contracting and the other
to the law of the place'of performance. These two rules have
often been considered as mutually incompatible by the protagon-
ists of each and separately unworkable by the antagonists of
both.7 The unprecedented extension of these rules gives rise to
serious criticism. No court has ever held and no writer has ever
advocated that simply because an offer was made in one state
the law of that state should apply to all the problems that may
arise out of the subsequent contract.
Assume that X, a New York businessman, is vacationing in
Atlantic City, New Jersey. While there, he wires Y in Illinois,
offering to sell him certain goods. This offer is accepted by Y
after X has returned to New York. According to the terms of the
contract delivery is to be made at X's place of business in New
York. Later X sets aside the goods from stock and notifies Y that
the goods are at his disposal. Before Y removes the goods, they
are destroyed by fire. Y sues for the return of the sale price in
New Jersey, where the Commercial Code has been adopted.
Under Section 2-509 of the proposed Commercial Code a "mer-
chant" bears the risk of loss until actual receipt of the goods by
the buyer. Under the Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4(1),
adopted in New York and Illinois, risk passes with title. Since
the offer was made in New Jersey, a court of that state must
apply Section 2-509. Is it possible that such a result was desired
by the draftsmen of Section 1-105? Certainly the parties never
expected the law of New Jersey to apply to any part of their
contract, nor did the contract have a substantial connection with
7. Cf. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on Conflicts (1947) 298, where the two
rules are combined in a proposed answer to the choice of law problem.
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New Jersey. The seller is especially injured because he is saddled
with a loss he had no reason to anticipate or guard against by
insurance. The entire rationale behind the adoption of choice of
law rules would be defeated by the application of such a rule.
Subsection 1 (c), providing that the code shall apply to con-
tracts or transactions involving "goods which are to be or are
in fact . . . received within this state," may readily yield an
unusual result. Assume that X and Y, both residents of Louisi-
ana, in that state enter into a contract to sell certain chattels.
X ships the goods to Y's address, but by mistake of the carrier,
the goods are carried to Tennessee, where an agent of Y there-
upon agrees to receive them. Assume that Tennessee has adopted
the Commercial Code, but Louisiana has not. Y now sues for
breach of warrantS in a Tennessee court. Since the goods were
in fact received in that state, the Commercial Code will apply,
even though the contract was made in Louisiana, the parties were
residents of this state and the contract was to be performed here.
Can it be supposed that the parties contemplated the application
of Tennessee law? The contract had all of its elements in Louisi-
ana, and connection with Tennessee was not established until long
after the contract was concluded. If, in the same case, there was
a dispute as to whether title had passed at the time of the con-
tract, rather than at the time of the delivery, the Commercial
Code would also determine that issue. This surprising conclusion
would be in clear contradiction to the well-settled rule8 of con-
flict of laws that problems of passage of title to chattels are deter-
mined by the law of the situs of the chattel at the time the title
is alleged to have passed. This rule is based on the convenience
and desirability of having one certain law apply to all title prob-
lems regardless of the place of the forum, the domicile of the
parties or the place of contracting. Title is usually of more im-
portance to a third person that to the parties contracting, and
with the lex rei sitae as the prevailing rule, any interested third
person may easily ascertain the validity of any purported transfer
of title by looking to the law of the place where the chattel was
situated at the time of the alleged title transfer. It would be
highly impractical to require third persons to search for the place
of the making of the conveyance, or the owner's domicile, or the
offer to the contract to sell. This policy of aiding the interests of
third persons has led the courts uniformly to distinguish title
problems from the general body of contract problems. Section
8. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2 ed. 1938) 473; Falconbridge, Conflict
of Laws (1947) 416.
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1-105 completely ignores this distinction and omits any mention
of the law applicable to title problems. As indicated in the above
illustration, title disputes under the code are apparently to be
referred to the same law that determines the contracting parties'
rights and obligations under the contract. If a suit involving the
title issue is instituted in a code state, then the code will be
applied if the transaction was in any way connected with the
state, regardless of the location of the chattel at the time of the
transaction in question. A state that has not adopted the code
will undoubtedly apply the lex rei sitae. This possible applica-
tion of two different laws, depending only on the forum chosen,
affords the plaintiff an undue advantage and leaves third persons
interested in the location of the title in an impossible position.
Subsection 1 (i), providing that the code shall apply to trans-
actions involving "a security interest created within this state,"
also ignores the situs of the property. If a "security interest" was
purported to be created in X affecting property in a distant state,
Y, subsequent interested persons have no possible way of de-
termining which of the two laws might apply to issues arising
with respect to the title to the property. Furthermore, the code
applies under Subsection 1 (i) "if the borrower's principal place of
business is within this state."9 If A, whose principal place of
business is in Y, gives a chattel mortgage to B on property in Y
while both parties are in X, the arbitrariness of applying the code
to any issues of title to the property is obvious. A's principal
place of business is completely inconsequential in the light of the
other circumstances.
Subsection 1 (c) states that the act is to apply where the
contract "relates to or involves goods which are to be or are in
fact delivered, shipped or received within [the] state," but it is
difficult to determine the exact meaning of the phrase relates to
or involves. Furthermore, does this provision mean that the act
applies to the entirety of the transaction, or only to that portion
of it which relates to or involves the goods? Apparently the
draftsmen intended that in such a case the entirety of the trans-
action, including its obligatory aspects, would come under the
9. This vague grammatical structure creates unnecessary problems of
interpretation. Section 1-105 declares that "this Act shall apply to any con-
tract or transaction within its terms if the contract is made or the transac-
tion occurs after the effective date of this Act, and ... ; or if the borrower's
principal place of business is within this state .... Does the act apply
to all transactions if the borrower's principal place of business is in the
forum state? What is meant by "the borrower"?
1950]
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purview of the act, but this leads to the surprising conclusion
that the act would apply to a case such as the following:
A and B, domiciliaries of Louisiana, enter into a contract in
this state, whereby A agrees to sell to B certain goods which C has
contracted to ship to A from New York. Assume that New York
has adopted the Commercial Code. If suit is brought in New York
on any phase of the contract, the courts of that state apparently
must apply the provisions of the act to the entirety of the contract
entered into between A and B simply because it "relates to" goods
which were shipped from New York. Is it possible that the con-
tracting parties could have envisioned the application of New
York law to the determination of their personal rights and duties
arising out of a contract of this nature?
The word "involves" used in Subsection 1 (c) through 1 (i)
presents the same difficulty as "relates to" in Subsection 1 (c).
Assume A and B enter into a contract to sell in Arkansas, which
has not adopted the Commercial Code, delivery to be in that
state. As part payment of the purchase price, A gives B com-
mercial paper that was once transferred in California, a state that
has adopted the Commercial Code. If action is brought in Cali-
fornia on the sale, the courts of that state would apparently be
required to apply the code to all issues raised, for the sale had
involved commercial paper which was transferred in California.
In this case there is no real choice of law problem as to the sale
itself. In this and numerous other situations, Section 1-105 would
create and "settle" a choice of law problem that was never
actually in existence. These examples indicate the possible con-
sequences of the use of such broad language as "relates to" and
"involves."
In the above two hypothetical cases, goods and commercial
paper have been used merely as illustrative of any of the items
enumerated in Section 1-105, but it is to be noted that documents
of title, commercial credits, foreign remittances, investment secu-
rities, or security interests are included within that category.
Even if the subsections dealing with goods and specific in-
struments of commerce should be interpreted as invoking the
code only in connection with issues under the instruments them-
selves or in connection with the goods, aside from other questions
of the general transaction between the parties, the result in many
cases will be unexpected and unreasonable. For example, assume
that commercial paper or a foreign remittance is drawn in Texas
by X and transferred to Y in Indiana. Y later transfers the
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instrument to B in Japan. A suit has now arisen betwee n Y and
B as to whether or not a valid transfer has taken place. If the
suit is brought in Indiana, which has adopted the code, the court
would have to apply the Commercial Code because the instru-
ment at one time had been transferred there. It can hardly be
argued that the transfer between Y and B in Japan has any
essential connection with Indiana. The parties could not possibly
have contemplated that Indiana law would be applied to issues
arising under such transfer.
Subsections 1(d) through 1(i) provide for the application
of the Commercial Code if the instruments therein mentioned are
made, drawn, issued, created or transferred within a state having
the code. It is startling to learn that the law of the place of some
remote transfer may determine the obligations of the maker,
drawer, issuer or prior or subsequent endorser or that the law of
the place of making, drawing, issuing or creation may determine
whether a valid transfer of the instrument took place in some
remote region. For illustration of the possibilities let us assume
the following: An investment security is issued in New York by
X corporation. Several years later the then holder transfers the
investment security to A in Illinois and still later A transfers it
to B in Wyoming. Apparently, if Wyoming had adopted the Com-
mercial Code, the courts of that state would have to apply it in
any action brought on the investment security by B against X
corporation. In the same case, if New York had adopted the code,
and Wyoming had not, the code would be applied if an action
was brought in New York to ascertain if a valid transfer had
taken place in Wyoming.
Two separate choice of law rules have been developed for
the determination of the applicable law in cases concerning nego-
tiable instruments. Generally, and subject to certain exceptions,
if there is a dispute between the principal obligor, that is, the
maker, drawer, or issuer on the one side and a subsequent holder
on the other, the courts will apply the law of the principal
obligor's place of business, if the instrument had its inception
there. This place is regarded as the seat of his obligation and
both the principal obligor and any subsequent holder should
reasonably expect the law of that place to determine the nature
of the obligation. On the other hand, there is no reason to require
the application of the law of the place of making, issuing,
or drawing to a transfer occurring in another state or foreign
country, since the parties would usually expect as reasonable
1950]
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men that the law of the place of transfer would apply to questions
concerning the transfer. Consequently the validity of such a
transfer is usually decided by the law of the place of the instru-
ment at the time of the transfer. This latter rule also enables
third persons interested in title location to know with certainty
the law determinative of that issue. Section 1-105 makes it pos-
sible for the law of the place of making to decide questions
arising out of any subsequent transfers as well as the obligation
of the principal debtor and for the law of the place of transfer
to decide not only the questions concerning transfers there made,
but also the obligations of the principal debtor.
Subsection 2 allows the parties to stipulate in writing that
the law of a specified jurisdiction shall apply to the transaction,
even though the transaction has sufficient contact with the forum
state to call for the application of the code. But this opportunity
is limited to those transactions involving foreign trade. The Com-
ment of the drafters states that "it was felt that it would be going
too far to require the application of the code to the American ac-
ceptance of a foreign offer which might come from one living under
a system of law quite different from our own and means for mak-
ing it inapplicable are therefore provided." Actually it would be
going too far in many instances to apply the code to a transaction
in interstate trade where the parties have stipulated that the law
of some state not having the code shall apply. This absence of
limitations on "contracting in" the Commercial Code and the
relatively narrow field where "contracting out" the Commercial
Code is allowed indicate with clarity that the sole motivation of
the drafters of this section has been to promote the wide applica-
tion of this new and improved commercial law.
Section 1-105 lays down fixed, determined, unchanging rules
as to choice of law. It directs the courts of states which have
adopted the Commercial Code to apply the code whenever any
of a variety of contacts have occurred within the state of the
forum. In numerous cases, the application of the provisions of
Section 1-105 would surprise the contracting parties whose justi-
fied expectations would find no protection from the courts. By
studying the choice of law rules of the several states, in conjunc-
tion with the substantive rules of those same states, a plaintiff
would be able to select a forum whose rules would combine to
give him victory. The defendant would be at the mercy of cir-
cumstances which have combined to cause his defeat in one
particular forum. If there is to be certainty and uniformity in
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the commercial world, then different courts must apply the same
rules to the settlement of disputes. Section 1-105 would not give
us the certainty, uniformity, and predictability that is a necessity
in the commercial world.
JACK C. CALDWELL
ROBERT T. JORDAN
GEORGE W. PUGH*
ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING NOTE
On August 20, 1949, the scholars interested in conflicts law,
including leading specialists, who met in Ann Arbor for a discus-
sion of world law problems, expressed their unanimous concern
about Section 1-105 of the proposed Commercial Code. They re-
solved on the motion of Professor Elliott E. Cheatham as fol-
lows:
"Resolved, that the undersigned, participants in the 1949
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, are of the opinion that Section 1-105 (in both forms)
of the May, 1949, draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing
with conflicts of laws, is unwise and should be omitted from the
Code; and the Executive Secretary of the Institute of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law is requested to transmit a copy of
this resolution to the President of the American Law Institute
and the Chairman of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws."
In the minds of those who signed there was not the slightest
doubt that the new work was badly disfigured by this crude
extension of the code to transactions subject to other legal sys-
tems under any existing conflicts theory. If some particularized
demonstration is needed, the foregoing students' note furnishes
illustration. The editors of this Review have requested my own
opinion, which cannot be more than a strictly personal comment
on the implications, not discussed at the Ann Arbor meeting, of
the resolution printed above.
The meeting voted simply for cancellation at the time being,
manifestly because of the considerable efforts necessary for estab-
lishing appropriate rules. Now, in my personal view and as far
as I can see, two different sets of rules of application should be
created.
On one hand, regular rules of conflict must be found, really
deserving the epithets, reasonable and not arbitrary. They may
* Graduate of February, 1950; presently Instructor in Law, Louisiana
State University.
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